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Abstract 
This contribution investigates the direct and indirect causal interactions between 
financial deepening, trade openness and economic growth for 13 Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. Using a rather general approach to identify indicators for 
financial deepening and to detect Granger causality within a VAR/VECM 
framework, we find almost no evidence for the popular hypothesis of finance-led 
growth. Evidence of bidirectional finance-growth causality is stronger but mostly 
unstable in the long run. Most results indicate a demand-following or insignificant 
relationship between finance and growth in Latin America. This finding seems to be 
consistent with regard to the weakness and deficiencies of the region's financial 
systems. Further, there is no evidence that finance indirectly and unilaterally induces 
growth via the channel of trade openness. Thus, policies that prioritize financial and 
trade liberalization cannot be supported by this study. Instead, a holistic policy 
approach seems to be preferable that promotes the determinants of both real sector 
growth and financial development. As a result, financial factors may positively and 
significantly contribute to economic development in the region. 
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This contribution investigates the direct and indirect causal interactions between 
financial deepening, trade openness and economic growth for 13 Latin American and 
Caribbean countries. Using a rather general approach to identify indicators for 
financial deepening and to detect Granger causality within a VAR/VECM 
framework, we find almost no evidence for the popular hypothesis of finance-led 
growth. Evidence of bidirectional finance-growth causality is stronger but mostly 
unstable in the long run. Most results indicate a demand-following or insignificant 
relationship between finance and growth in Latin America. This finding seems to be 
consistent with regard to the weakness and deficiencies of the region's financial 
systems. Further, there is no evidence that finance indirectly and unilaterally induces 
growth via the channel of trade openness. Thus, policies that prioritize financial and 
trade liberalization cannot be supported by this study. Instead, a holistic policy 
approach seems to be preferable that promotes the determinants of both real sector 
growth and financial development. As a result, financial factors may positively and 
significantly contribute to economic development in the region. 
                                                 
§ Running Title: Finance, Openness and Growth I. Introduction 
With the emergence of the endogenous growth theory, the direct and indirect 
influence of financial markets on economic growth has drawn considerable attention, 
particularly with regard to sound development strategies. The most influential 
contributions on the relationship between finance and growth identify financial 
development as a crucial precondition of long-run growth, suggesting that financial 
liberalization is an important instrument of economic policy. Accordingly, financial 
sector reforms have been implemented in the Latin American region since the early 
1990s (Herrero et al., 2000; Aizenman, 2005). The hope was that such measures 
would unleash finance-growth interactions, e.g. through an increase in savings or the 
allure of external financing which would drive investments and ultimately growth 
rates (Aizenman, 2005). However, the effectiveness of such policies requires that 
causality between financial deepening and economic growth runs conveniently and 
significantly. 
The aim of this contribution is to assess whether financial deepening has 
actually swayed economic development in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 
past and whether liberalization strategies in this context constitute appropriate policy 
tools to foster development in the region. In general, we therefore test for causality 
between financial development and economic growth, capturing further indirect 
linkages between finance and growth by also scrutinizing the relationship between 
finance and trade openness. 
The remainder of this contribution is structured as follows: Section 2 provides 
a summary of the theoretical considerations that form the basis of our empirical 
analysis. In addition, some empirical evidence is referred to. Section 3 introduces the 
applied methodology and data. Section 4 presents and discusses the results of the causality analyses, deducing implications for economic theory and policy. Section 5 
concludes with a summary. 
 
II. Literature Review 
Links between Finance, Openness and Growth: Theory and Evidence 
Financial markets provide an economy with certain vital services which e.g. 
comprise the management of risk and information, or the pooling and mobilization of 
savings. In general, more ample and efficient, i.e. deeper financial systems are 
associated with a more effective supply of such financial services to the real sector. 
From a theoretical point of view, linkages between financial and economic 
development may take different forms. On the one hand, the financial sector is 
expected to affect growth through two channels, the accumulation channel and the 
allocation channel. The accumulation channel emphasizes the growth-driving effects 
of physical and human capital accumulation (e.g. Pagano, 1993). The allocation 
channel focuses on a finance-induced increase in the efficiency of resource allocation 
and its growth-enhancing effects (e.g. King and Levine, 1993). In general, following 
these considerations causality then runs from finance to growth (supply-leading 
hypothesis). On the other hand, the development of the financial sector may also be 
stimulated by economic growth. For instance, in a growing economy the private 
sector may demand new financial instruments and an increasing access to external 
finance. Hence, financial sector activities then simply expand in step with general 
economic development (Robinson, 1952; Patrick, 1966), positing the so-called 
demand-following hypothesis. Additionally, finance and growth may be mutually 
dependent. For instance, the real sector may provide the financial system with the 
funds necessary to enable financial deepening, eventually allowing for a 
capitalization on financial economies of scale which facilitate economic development in consequence (e.g. Berthelemy and Varoudakis, 1996; Blackburn and Hung, 1998). 
The latter hypothesis therefore postulates bidirectional causality between finance and 
growth.
1 Following views that are more sceptical towards finance-growth linkages, 
the financial and real sector may also be independent from each other, thereby 
naturally putting emphasis on other factors that may determine economic 
development instead (insignificant causation).
2 
Empirical evidence suggests that there are economies that have indeed 
benefited from well-developed financial systems in the past.
3 Other evidence is more 
inconclusive. For some of the very successful emerging market economies, finance 
appears to have been a crucial factor for economic success, e.g. in Taiwan (Chang 
and Caudill, 2005). However, it is not always possible to identify such a strong effect 
of finance on growth in mature OECD countries (e.g. Shan and Morris, 2002). For 
developing economies, the results are similarly diverse. Some studies find a strong 
impact of finance on growth (Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004), while others find the 
finance-growth relationship to be more complex (Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; 
Arestis and Demetriades, 1997; Al-Awad and Harb, 2005). In general, empirical 
                                                 
1 In addition, the relationship between finance and growth may also change over time as a country 
passes through different stages of development. In the early stages finance either leads growth but its 
impact on growth diminishes as an economy develops (Patrick, 1966), or finance follows growth but 
eventually becomes a factor that contributes to growth after a threshold of financial development is 
reached (Berthelemy and Varoudakis, 1996). 
2 In this connection, Lucas (1988, p.6) famously states: “In general, I believe that the importance of 
financial matters is very badly over-stressed in popular and even much professional discussion and so 
am not inclined to be apologetic for going to the other extreme.” 
3 For long-term studies with a historic focus that emphasize the role of financial development in 
economic takeoff, see e.g. Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) and Sylla (2002). evidence strongly suggests there is a country-specific dimension to finance-growth 
dynamics that accounts for the frequently ambiguous results across countries.
4 
A potentially strong relationship between financial markets and trade opens 
up a further channel through which financial systems and real sectors may interact. 
On the one hand, better financial systems may constitute a comparative advantage for 
industrial sectors that heavily rely on external financing (Kletzer and Bardhan, 1987; 
Beck, 2003). Therefore, countries with developed financial systems are expected to 
exhibit industrial and trade structures that are linked to finance-dependent industry 
sectors. On the other hand, increased trade openness may trigger the demand for new 
financial products. As argued by Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002), trade carries risks 
that are linked to external shocks and foreign competition. Thus, more trade 
openness may lead to more ample financial instruments and institutions that are able 
to provide appropriate insurance and risk diversification. Rajan and Zingales (2003) 
argue that trade openness may also induce financial development with respect to 
effects from political economy. Domestic interest groups have a natural interest in 
obstructing financial development in order to prevent competitors from entering the 
market. As international competition increases, such groups shift their interests 
towards positive financial sector development. 
Empirically, Beck (2003) shows that countries with better financial systems 
exhibit higher trade shares in industries that depend on external finance, concluding 
that finance is a crucial determinant of trade structures. Similarly, Svaleryd and 
Vlachos (2005) find that financial sectors significantly determine industrial 
specialization patterns across OECD countries. In general, the relationship between 
                                                 
4 For a far more extensive discussion of potential theoretical and empirical connections between 
finance and growth, we refer to the excellent surveys of Pagano (1993) and Levine (2005). finance and openness has yet not been studied exhaustively. However, evidence 
indicates that a nexus between the two factors indeed exists. 
The interaction between finance and openness subsequently also allows for 
more complex paths to economic development. If finance induces openness, it may 
subsequently foster growth when openness is found to be a growth-driving factor. As 
for related mechanics, openness may induce economic growth by, among others, 
increasing a country's level of specialization and positively affecting innovation and 
technological diffusion (Harrison, 1996). Conversely, economic development may 
also trigger a country's level of trade openness, e.g. with shifts in production and 
demand patterns as well as increased levels of international integration that 
accompany national industrialization experiences.
5 What is more, if increasing trade 
openness leads to an increase in financial development, it may promote economic 
growth where financial deepening is found to enhance growth via the allocative and 
accumulative channels, as discussed above. 
 
Economic Development and Financial Systems in Latin America and the Caribbean 
With an average per capita income growth of 1.3% between 1960 and 2000, the 
Latin American region has experienced comparatively disappointing economic 
development during the last 40 years (De Gregorio and Lee, 2004). The region's 
financial systems are strongly bank-based, where the levels of financial development 
and financial efficiency are comparatively low, even after attempts to reform the 
                                                 
5 Empirically, Edwards (1998) provides some empirical evidence for the hypothesis that trade 
openness leads economic growth, finding that more open economies experience greater productivity 
growth. In contrast, Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) generally find only very limited support for a strong 
and positive link between openness and economic development. financial sector since the early 1990s (Herrero et al., 2002). The levels of trade 
openness have been similarly low. 
De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) find that financial development and 
economic growth negatively correlated in the 1970s and 1980s, and that poor levels 
of financial intermediation impacted negatively on investment allocation efficiency. 
In contrast, Nazmi (2005) detects a positive impact of financial development on 
economic growth and investment between 1960 and 1995. These positive effects are 
explained as a result of financial sector liberalization. This rare and inconclusive 
empirical evidence on the interaction between finance, openness and growth 
motivates our analysis even further. 
 
III. Econometric Procedure and Data 
General Concept 
We start with a brief description of our methodological framework. We first create a 
composite indicator of financial deepening via principal component analysis. 
Thereby, we should be able to capture developments in the financial sector in a 
broader sense while avoiding problems associated with multicollinearity, over-
parameterization and over-fitting. Second, we employ unit root and cointegration 
tests to identify the stationary properties and possible cointegration relationships of 
the investigated time series. By building on integration and cointegration results 
accordingly, we evade spurious regression results in the following causality analyses. 
Third, we test for Granger causality in a modified framework following Hsiao 
(1979, 1982), using bivariate and trivariate vector autoregressive (VAR) or vector 
error correction models (VECM).
6 Misspecifications within such models may lead to 
                                                 
6 This causality testing procedure has been employed in a number of previous studies, e.g. in Bajo-
Rubio and Montavez-Garces (2002), beyond the applications given in Hsiao (1979, 1982). spurious and inconsistent results (Braun and Mittnik, 1993). Standard Granger 
causality analyses may suffer from problems of arbitrary lag length selection because 
the considered variables are constrained to enter at the same lag length. Our 
procedure avoids such problems as all variables may enter at different lag lengths. 
We are also able to differentiate between short-run and long-run causality. Here, we 
take any error correction (ECM) term estimate as evidence of a long-run causal 
relationship between the considered variables. However, such an interpretation is 
only feasible if the ECM term is negative and statistically significant (Wickens, 
1996). 
When we first test for causality between finance and growth, we build on the 
hypotheses sketched in the previous section. That is, we try to find evidence for the 
supply-leading, demand-following, bidirectional causality or insignificant causation 
hypotheses. When we later test for causality between finance and openness, and 
growth and openness, we hypothesize by analogy. Thus, causality again may run in 
only one or both directions, or may found to be insignificant. 
 
Data 
Two standard data sources have been exploited.
7 We use annual time series 
observations that are absolutely sufficient to ensure the quality of our analyses, as 
argued by Hakkio and Rush (1991). Level data for the individual financial institution 
indicators used in the subsequent principal component analysis is taken from the 
                                                 
7 Using data from several sources may prove inappropriate. Hanousek et al. (2007) point out that 
estimation results may be sensitive to the choice of data sources. Hence, data sensitivity problems may 
contaminate the results. However, in our case the considered series that employ data from different 
sources generally exhibit a high level of correlation, thus reducing problems associated with data 
choice. Financial Development and Structure Database of Beck et al. (2000). It is referred to 
the latest database version of 2005.
8 Specifically, we extract commercial bank assets 
to commercial bank plus central bank assets (DBMA), liquid liabilities to GDP (LL), 
private credit by deposit money banks to GDP (PC) and bank deposits to GDP 
(BDGDP) as finance proxies. Further level data for economic growth and trade 
openness is taken from the PENN World Table, version 6.2, compiled by Heston et 
al. (2006). As for economic growth, the standard proxy of real GDP per capita is 
employed, labelled GROWTH (G). As for trade openness, the sum of exports plus 
imports to real GDP is utilized, labelled TRADE (T). As Harrison (1996) suggests, 
this measure constitutes a simple and common indicator of trade openness.
9 In the 
case of real GDP per capita and trade openness, GDP is measured in international US 
dollars. GROWTH and TRADE are taken as the differences of logarithms. 
 
Principal Component Analysis 
In related literature, several proxies for financial deepening are used, e.g. monetary 
aggregates such as M2 to GDP or financial intermediation parameters such as the 
ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP. To date there is no consensus 
on the superiority of any of these indicators. Following the recent example by Ang 
and McKibbin (2007), we construct a broad composite indicator of financial 
deepening. Specifically, we use the finance proxies DBMA, LL, PC and BDGDP to 
construct this index which is labelled DEPTH ( D). We utilize finance indicators 
                                                 
8 In the case of Colombia, a few variables are missing and therefore have to be imputed by average. 
9 As suggested by, inter alia, Harrison (1996) and Edwards (1998), a number of potentially more 
sophisticated measures for trade openness exist. Still, these measures raise the question of availability. 
In general, we consider TRADE to be a rather rough openness indicator that however constitutes a 
convenient trade off between accessibility and accuracy. associated with bank development due to the strongly bank-based nature of the 
region's financial systems. Methodologically, principal component analysis is 
commonly used to reduce data sets to lower dimensions while retaining as much 
information of the original sets as possible. Having transformed the finance 
indicators into natural logarithms, only the first unrotated principal component is 
extracted in the course of the analysis and employed as DEPTH.
10 
Table 1 gives an overview of the results of the principal component analysis 
as well as a descriptive overview of the chosen countries. Our index DEPTH is 
usually the only component to show fitting characteristics. It generally exhibits at 
least 60% of the initial variance of the considered series and hence provides a 
sufficient amount of information on financial deepening. In reference to the 
respective component matrices, it is obvious that DEPTH does not measure exactly 
the same aspect of financial deepening, i.e. of financial efficiency and size of the 
financial sector, across all countries. Still, we regard the composite indicator as a 
functional measure, particularly when considering the discussion about a general lack 
of a truly consistent measure of financial development. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
Unit Root and Cointegration Tests 
As a next step, a unit root test is employed in order to check if the considered time 
series are stationary, i.e. I(0), or first difference-stationary, i.e. I(1). We use the unit 
root test of Phillips and Perron (1998), the PP test. Our choice for the PP is based on 
                                                 
10 The Principal Component Analysis was conducted using SPSS, version 13. Other software 
packages utilized during this analysis include EViews, version 5.0, Stata, version 9.2, and Gretl, 
version 1.6.4, available at http://gretl.sourceforge.net. Choi and Chung (1995) who argue that the PP test is more powerful when low 
sampling frequency data, i.e. annual data is employed, compared to other unit root 
tests. 
As reported in Table 2, in almost all cases the PP test does not reject the null 
hypothesis of the existence of a unit root for the data at levels, whereas in almost all 
cases the null hypothesis is rejected strongly when the first difference is taken. The 
examined time series are thus I(1) at levels and I(0) when taking the first difference, 
so we employ a difference filter to obtain stationarity.
11 
 
Table 2 here 
 
As a third step of the analysis, we test for the rank of cointegration in 
bivariate and trivariate VAR models, following Johansen (1988) and Johansen and 
Juselius (1990). Generally, this complex procedure involves testing how many 
eigenvalues of a cointegrating matrix significantly depart from zero in order to obtain 
its cointegrating rank. Two tests are available, namely the trace statistic and the 
maximum eigenvalue test. In the following, only the trace statistic is used to estimate 
the rank of the respective models so as to obtain more robust results (Cheung and 
Lai, 1993). The test for cointegration is conducted within a VAR framework. The 
optimal lag length of the considered time series is chosen by the more conservative 
                                                 
11 In the case of Chile and Suriname where the results are not always as expected, we conduct an 
alternative unit root test following Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). Here, the results generally confirm the 
assumption that the time series are indeed all I(1) at levels and first-difference stationary. The 
unexpected unit root test results may hence be mainly attributed to the comparably smaller number of 
observations. Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) due to its superior accuracy (Koehler and 
Murphree, 1988). 
Table 3 shows the cointegration results for the trivariate VAR models.
12 For 
Mexico, Ecuador and El Salvador, no cointegration relationship in the trivariate 
models is detected. For the other countries, at most one cointegration relationship 
between the three series is found at either the 5% or 10% significance level. When a 
cointegration relationship is present, finance, growth and trade openness share a 
common trend and long-run equilibrium, as suggested theoretically. Due to a 
cointegration relationship, we include an ECM and hence any VAR passes into a 
VECM (Engle and Granger, 1987).
13 
 
Table 3 here 
 
Hsiao's Version of the Granger Causality Test 
The Granger (1969) definition of non-causality states that if one is able to better 
predict a series  t x  when including information from a series  t y  instead of only 
employing lagged values of  t x , then  t y  Granger-causes  t x , denoted  t t x y ⇒ . 
Bidirectional causality, or feedback, is present when  t x  also Granger-causes  t y , 
where such feedback is denoted  t t x y ⇔ . By combining this definition of causality 
with Akaike’s (1969) Final Prediction Error (FPE), Hsiao’s approach towards 
causality can be conducted.  
                                                 
12 Cointegration analyses are also conducted in all bivariate cases but not reported in order to save 
space. 
13 We do not consider more than one cointegration relationship in our analysis, even though this may 
not be ruled out completely in certain cases. The relative shortness of our time series and the desire for 
a good interpretation of the ECM motivate this more cautious approach. In its basic form, the causality testing procedure requires us to first consider 
the subsequent autoregressive process: 
  t t
m
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The sigma sign in front of L indicates the lag order of the series, L is the lag 
operator  1 − = t t y Ly ,  t u  is a white noise term with the usual statistical properties, α  
is a constant term and β  is the coefficient of the exogenous variables. 
We choose the lag order that yields the smallest FPE, denoted  ) 0 , (m FPEy , 
where the individual FPE are calculated in accordance with the following equation 
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Here,  T  is the number of observations and SSE  is the residual sum of 
squares.  
Now, we allow another variable  t x  to enter the model, so we receive the 
subsequent VAR: 
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Again, the sigma sign in front of L indicates the lag order of the respective 
series,  L is the lag operator  1 − = t t y Ly ,  t u  and  t v  are white noise terms with the 
usual statistical properties, α  is a constant term and  γ β,  are the coefficients of the 
exogenous variables. 
While  t y  steadily enters (3.1) with the lag order from (2) that yields the 
smallest FPE,  * m ,  t x  enters with a sequence of lags varying from 1 to n. Analogously, the FPE of (3.1) are computed, with the specific lag order  * *,n m  
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By comparing the two minimal FPE, we can draw conclusions on causality. If 
*) *, ( ) 0 *, ( n m FPE m FPE y y > , then  t t y x ⇒ , thus Granger causality is established. If 
*) *, ( ) 0 *, ( n m FPE m FPE y y < , then  t t y x ⇒ /  and no Granger causality is detected. 
Testing for causality from  t y  to  t x  requires us to repeat the previously described 
steps, now with  t x  as the dependent variable. 
 
IV. Causality Analysis 
Model Specification 
With respect to the specific conditions of our analysis, Hsiao's original approach 
needs to be adjusted. First, we use our results on integration and cointegration, i.e. 
we employ a first difference filter to achieve stationarity and an ECM whenever 
cointegration evidence requires this to be applied. Second, in order to obviate the 
possibility of spurious causality detection, the causality procedure is conducted in a 
trivariate model, so we test for causality between two series, conditional upon the 
presence of a third. The previous discussion of possible interactions between finance, 
openness and growth provides the ground for such specifications. As the theory 
suggests interactions between all three considered series, a subsequent exchange of 
control variables is implemented, possibly rendering a richer picture of 
interdependencies between financial deepening, economic growth and openness. 
Besides, causal interactions are established and interpreted according to the 
previous introduction. In the short run, causality inferences are made by analogy by comparing the minimal FPE of the bivariate and trivariate case. If we include an 
ECM term to account for cointegration relationships, we take the ECM term as an 
indicator of long-run causality accordingly. If no cointegration relationship is 
included, then we conduct the analyses in simple trivariate VAR in differences. In 
these cases, we refer to the results of respective F-tests that indicate if the regression 
coefficients of the VAR are statistically significant. If the F-test statistics indicate no 
sufficient significance, then any possible causality inference may be spurious, having 
only limited explanatory and analytical power. 
 
Finance-Growth Causality and Further Implications 
First, we investigate the causal interaction between financial deepening and 
economic growth. The theory suggests that finance may either be an important or a 
negligible factor of economic development. As for the former, we may expect 
support for the supply-leading or bidirectional hypotheses. As for the latter, we may 
expect evidence for demand-following or insignificant finance-growth causation. 
Table 4 gives the results of the interaction between DEPTH and GROWTH, 
conditional on TRADE. The results generally show no sign of autocorrelation or 
multicollinearity and appear to be statistically significant and stable, especially with 
respect to the lag orders chosen in accordance with the causality testing procedure. 
 
Table 4 here 
 
Our causality analysis indicates that financial deepening and economic 
growth have shared a rather weak relationship over the past decades in Latin 
America, specifically that finance has not unidirectionally promoted economic 
development. We find support for the supply-leading hypothesis only in the case of Colombia. There is more ample evidence of bidirectional causality which is 
detectable in the cases of Costa Rica, Chile, the Dominican Republic and Suriname. 
However, bidirectional causality appears to be truly stable in the long run only in the 
case of Chile. For Mexico, Honduras, Paraguay and Guatemala, evidence indicates 
that finance follows growth, where the results are not stable in the cases of Mexico 
and Honduras. Our results suggest that financial and real sectors are independent in 
Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador and Jamaica. That is, in about 65% of all 
investigated countries we find support for the demand-following or insignificant 
causation hypothesis. Hence, our findings generally echo more sceptical theoretical 
and empirical considerations that likewise suggest rather weak and instable finance-
growth linkages. 
Our results also fit in reasonably well with findings that financial systems 
play only a minor role in development processes in South and Central America due 
to financial sector weaknesses and inefficiencies. Any demand-following or 
disconnected causal relationship may support the hypothesis that a matching of 
financial development and the general development level has not yet been reached in 
a considerable number of countries. It seems that only if financial deepening 
corresponds to the needs of the development process will the financial sector become 
a growth driving factor for an economy. Such a hypothesis also corresponds with our 
limited evidence of any long-run finance-growth causality emerging through the 
ECM. 
Our findings moreover suggest that recent financial liberalization which has 
taken place in Latin America since the 1990s had disappointing effects on economic 
performance because of the apparent lack of a close link between finance and 
growth. Thus, we argue that big push policies of financial liberalization and financial 
reforms should be considered carefully. The rather poor economic performance of Latin America over the past decades has to a considerable extent been due to low 
levels of investment and deficiencies in physical and human capital accumulation 
(De Gregorio, 1992; De Gregorio and Lee, 2004). However, as discussed before, we 
may link an increase in financial development to an increase in an economy's 
accumulative capabilities and allocative efficiency. Given our empirical evidence, we 
may at least partially attribute low growth rates in Latin America to a deficient match 
of financial and real sector development. Sound economic policies should aim to 
sway financial development accordingly. For instance, better macroeconomic 
stability, improved institutional quality or a stronger focus on development-specific 
institutional surroundings of financial systems may influence financial deepening and 
financial sector policies favorably (Rousseau and Wachtel, 2002; Arestis and Stein, 
2005; Demetriades and Law, 2006). Through this, over time the development of 
regional financial systems may correspond more adequately to real sector activities, 
in consequence facilitating economic development. 
 
Finance-Openness Causality and Further Implications 
Next, we look at the causation between financial deepening and trade openness. Part 
of the theory suggests that finance may unilaterally lead openness as a comparative 
advantage for outward-oriented industries, or that openness may induce financial 
development as a consequence of trade-associated internal and external influences. A 
nexus between finance and openness may additionally allow for bidirectional 
causality. Following more sceptical views, we may also find no evidence for 
significant causality between finance and openness. 
Table 5 shows the results for the causal inferences of DEPTH and TRADE, 
controlling for GROWTH. Our results again show no sign of autocorrelation or multicollinearity and appear to be statistically significant and stable, particularly with 
respect to the chosen lag orders. 
 
Table 5 here 
 
We find no clear support for the hypothesis that financial development 
induces trade openness or for the reverse causation. Both patterns of causation are 
present, yet not convincingly predominant. Our evidence rather indicates that trade 
openness and financial deepening share a feedback relationship, with finance acting 
on the structure of outward-oriented industries and trade openness simultaneously 
impacting the process of financial deepening. Even though our results do not appear 
to suggest stable long-run finance-openness causality for all examined countries, we 
find that the theoretical assumption of a nexus between finance and openness is 
generally valid. Only in the case of Mexico and Guatemala do the two series indeed 
share no causal linkage. 
Still, the effects of such interactions on general economic development appear 
to be marginal. On the one hand, the impact of openness on financial deepening has 
not translated into higher growth rates, as our previous results indicate. On the other 
hand, neither do we find evidence of any indirect effect of finance on growth via its 
impact on trade openness, as shown by the results of the causality analysis for 
GROWTH and TRADE, conditional on DEPTH, that are reported in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 here 
 
Mostly, the two series either share a feedback relationship or growth causes 
openness unilaterally. We find support for the hypothesis of a unidirectional, growth-promoting effect of trade openness only in the cases of Guatemala and Suriname, 
where these results are not stable in the long run. 
Our findings tend to confirm studies that neglect a leading influence of 
openness on economic development. Furthermore, our results are also consistent 
with former findings that detect no significant impact of openness on growth in the 
presence of weak financial systems (Berthelemy and Varoudakis, 1996). We can 
additionally assert that financial development does not indirectly induce growth in a 
unilateral way by promoting openness which in turn positively acts on growth. 
Rather, we can assess that such interactions commonly happen only feedback-wise 
for some examined countries, e.g. in the cases of Chile and Honduras. 
More generally, our results suggest that for Latin America and the Caribbean 
policies that center on the liberalization of both the financial and trade sectors affect 
overall economic performance only to a limited extent, particularly in the short run. 
 
V. Summary 
Drawing on conflicting theoretical considerations about the causal interactions 
between financial deepening, economic growth and trade openness, we have tested 
for causality in 13 Latin American and Caribbean countries. We used principal 
component analysis to determine an indicator of financial deepening. Subsequently 
employing Hsiao's version of Granger causality within a VAR/VECM framework 
has several advantages which were discussed. 
Our empirical findings and policy implications can be summarized as follows. 
First, for Latin America and the Caribbean we detect almost no evidence of finance-
led growth. Second, evidence of bidirectional causality is stronger, yet appears to be 
unstable in the long run. Third, most results point at a demand-following or 
insignificant causal interaction between finance and growth in the Latin American region. We thus provide support for a more sceptical view on the finance-growth 
relationship. While we find some evidence that suggests interdependencies between 
the financial sector and trade openness, such interactions do not appear to 
significantly translate into enhanced economic performance. There is no evidence 
that finance indirectly induces growth via the channel of promoting trade openness. 
In the light of our results, we question policies that prioritize financial sector and 
trade liberalization. Financial sector and trade development do not appear to be 
preconditions of economic development in Latin America. Instead, we advocate a 
more balanced policy approach that also takes into account other fundamental growth 
factors, such as factor endowments, institutions or a country's general stage of 
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DEPTH  Component Matrix 
 
DMBA       LL         PC         BDGDP 
Mexico 1960-2004  UMI  63.08%  0.341  0.948  0.796  0.935 
Venezuela 1960-2004  UMI  75.86%  0.513  0.959  0.968  0.936 
Costa Rica  1960-2004  UMI  61.53%  -0.818  0.913  -0.380  0.903 
Ecuador 1960-2004  LMI  65.22%  0.549  0.896  0.831  0.902 
Honduras 1960-2004  LMI  85.26%  0.763  0.958  0.974  0.981 
El Salvador  1960-2003  LMI  72.12%  -0.010  0.989  0.964  0.988 
Paraguay 1960-2003  LMI  84.64%  0.781  0.982  0.935  0.968 
Guatemala 1960-2003  LMI  68.66%  0.020  0.978  0.927  0.964 
Dominican Republic  1960-2003  LMI  86.78%  0.817  0.959  0.941  0.987 
Colombia 1960-2003  LMI  78.55%  0.787  0.891  0.948  0.911 
Chile 1974-2004  UMI  94.91%  0.948  0.979  0.985  0.984 
Suriname 1970-2003  LMI  84.06%  -0.818  0.990  0.858  0.988 
Jamaica 1960-2003  LMI  70.61%  -0.738  0.963  0.674  0.948 
Notes: The Column Country Income Class follows the usual measurement of the World Bank and is 
taken from Beck et al. (2000). UMI denotes Upper Middle Income, LMI Lower Middle Income. The 
column DEPTH gives the value of the initial eigenvalues as percentage of the total variance the first 
principal component contains (percentage of variance criterion) that represents the composite indicator 



























 Table 2. Phillips-Perron Unit Root Test Statistics 
 
Country Level  First Difference 
  ) ( a t Z   ) ( at t Z   ) ( a t Z   ) ( at t Z  
G -2.313  -1.690  -4.850*** -5.173*** 
T 1.871  -1.375  -4.196*** -4.636*** 
Mexico 
D -2.080  -2.129  -5.296*** -5.228*** 
G -2.310  -1.890  -5.221*** -5.310*** 
T -1.661  -1.437  -8.973*** -9.083*** 
Venezuela 
D -1.029  -1.203  -5.473*** -5.630*** 
G -0.736  -1.616  -4.825*** -4.799*** 
T -0.330  -1.970  -5.227*** -5.159*** 
Costa Rica 
D -1.651  -0.791  -4.807*** -5.101*** 
G -1.661  -0.992  -4.477*** -4.754*** 
T -1.085  -1.933  -6.808*** -6.763*** 
Ecuador 
D -1.806  -2.626  -5.489*** -5.427*** 
G -1.671  -1.387  -6.498*** -11.505*** 
T -2.406  -2.532  -4.653*** -4.628*** 
Honduras 
D -0.613  -1.778  -3.757*** -3.704** 
G -1.708  -2.041  -3.443** -3.561** 
T -0.113  -0.712  -5.895*** -5.973*** 
El Salvador 
D -1.004  -2.499  -4.449*** -4.381*** 
G -1.792  -0.081  -3.380** -3.729** 
T -1.058  -2.377  -6.128*** -6.064*** 
Paraguay 
D -1.248  -1.953  -3.657*** -3.691** 
G -2.376  -1.644  -4.051*** -4.274*** 
T -1.629  -1.623  -6.073*** -6.002*** 
Guatemala 
D -1.862  -2.038  -5.031*** -5.047*** 
G -0.462  -2.442  -5.919*** -5.832*** 
T -2.408  -2.319  -6.808*** -6.934*** 
Dominican 
Republic 
D -0.520  -2.023  -5.580*** -5.546*** 
G -2.004  -0.469  -3.787*** -4.143** 
T -0.348  -2.203  -7.257*** -7.335*** 
Colombia 
D -0.410  -1.772  -3.824*** -3.877** 
G 0.486  -2.536  -4.982*** -4.773*** 
T -2.279  -2.422  -4.934*** -4.898*** 
Chile 
D -4.320*** -2.543  -1.786  -2.726 
G -1.144  -1.480  -5.781*** -5.778*** 
T -2.716* -2.729  -9.511*** -8.895*** 
Suriname 
D -1.548  -1.684  -3.178** -3.045 
G -2.170  -2.161  -4.633*** 4.599*** 
T -1.235  -2.032  -6.113*** -6.047*** 
Jamaica 
D -2.055  -1.499  -3.653*** -3.745** 
Notes:  ) ( a t Z  and  ) ( at t Z denote the PP test statistics with a constant and constant with a 
linear trend, respectively. (***), (**), (*) denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 








 Table 3. Johansen Cointegration Trace Statistics for Trivariate VAR 
 










Mexico None  24.45902  29.79707  27.06695 
 At  most  1  11.56195  15.49471  13.42878 
 At  most  2  0.056557  3.841466  2.705545 
Venezuela None  31.08861  29.79707** 27.06695* 
 At  most  1  11.92365  15.49471  13.42878 
 At  most  2  3.497589  3.841466  2.705545* 
Costa Rica  None  33.40523  29.79707** 27.06695 
  At most 1  14.15922  15.49471  13.42878* 
  At most 2  1.675720  3.841466  2.705545* 
Ecuador None  19.98839  29.79707  27.06695 
 At  most  1  6.104672  15.49471  13.42878 
 At  most  2  1.000068  3.841466  2.705545 
Honduras None  29.22760  29.79707  27.06695* 
 At  most  1  10.98845  15.49471  13.42878 
 At  most  2  1.649849  3.841466  2.705545 
El Salvador  None  17.19267  29.79707  27.06695 
 At  most  1  8.997328  15.49471  13.42878 
 At  most  2  1.115795  3.841466  2.705545 
Paraguay None  27.36907  29.79707  27.06695* 
 At  most  1  11.57968  15.49471  13.42878 
 At  most  2  3.647710  3.841466  2.705545* 
Guatemala None  34.20709  29.79707** 27.06695* 
 At  most  1  15.39020  15.49471  13.42878* 
 At  most  2  6.397096  3.841466** 2.705545* 
Dominican Republic  None  28.48669  29.79707  27.06695* 
 At  most  1  8.309928  15.49471  13.42878 
 At  most  2  1.418959  3.841466  2.705545 
Colombia None  28.30022  29.79707  27.06695* 
 At  most  1  9.032229  15.49471  13.42878 
 At  most  2  3.573916  3.841466  2.705545* 
Chile None  51.02365  29.79707** 27.06695* 
 At  most  1  6.914879  15.49471  13.42878 
 At  most  2  0.172307  3.841466  2.705545 
Suriname None  28.14208  29.79707  27.06695* 
 At  most  1  13.29969  15.49471  13.42878 
 At  most  2  1.689383  3.841466  2.705545 
Jamaica None  29.71583  29.79707  27.06695* 
 At  most  1  13.34400  15.49471  13.42878 
 At  most  2  4.978295  3.841466  2.705545* 
Notes: (**) and (*) denote rejection of the respective hypothesis at the 5% and 10% 
significance level, respectively. The test was conducted under the assumption of a linear 
deterministic trend. The respective lag order of the underlying VAR was chosen via the BIC, 
where the maximum lag length was 5, with the exceptions being Chile (maximum of 3 lags) 
































































































































































































-0.020 i)  NO 
ii) NO 
Notes: m, n and p denote the lags leading to the respective smallest FPE, where the maximum 
lag length was 5, with the exception of Chile (maximum of 3 lags) and Suriname (maximum of 
4 lags) due to shorter time horizons. (*), (**) and (***) denote significance of the ECM at 10%, 
5% and 1% levels, respectively. (a) indicates an insignificant F-statistic of the respective 













































































































































































































-0.084***  i) YES  
ii) YES 
Notes:  m,  n and p denote the lags leading to the respective smallest FPE, where the 
maximum lag length was 5, with the exception of Chile (maximum of 3 lags) and Suriname 
(maximum of 4 lags) due to shorter time horizons. (*), (**) and (***) denote significance 
of the ECM at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (a) indicates an insignificant F-
statistic of the respective estimation, while (b) indicates an ECM term that is insignificant 












































































































































































































-0.148*** i)  YES 
ii) YES 
Notes: m, n and p denote the lags leading to the respective smallest FPE, where the maximum 
lag length was 5, with the exception of Chile (maximum of 3 lags) and Suriname (maximum 
of 4 lags) due to shorter time horizons. (*), (**) and (***) denote significance of the ECM at 
10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. (a) indicates an insignificant F-statistic of the 
respective estimation, while (b) indicates an ECM term that is insignificant or has a wrong 
sign. 
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